When risks are interdependent, an agent´s decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilites faced by others. Due to these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred on others. This paper analyzes an insurance market with externalities of loss prevention. It is shown in a model with heterogenous agents and imperfect information that a monopolistic insurer can achieve the social optimum by engaging in premium discrimination. An insurance monopoly reduces not only costs of risk selection, but may also play an important role in loss prevention.
Introduction
Wealth is subject to possible loss, and therefore rational agents (private firms or individuals) desire to invest in loss prevention activities that reduce the probability of loss.
1 An interesting feature of individual loss prevention is that it may affect the risks faced by others. In many cases of individual investment decisions, the ultimate risk of each decision-maker depends in some way on the actions of others. The risks are interdependent. The individual risk can then be broken down into direct and indirect sources. The direct risk arises because of an agent´s own actions, and can be reduced or eliminated by an investment in prevention. The indirect risk lies entirely in the hands of other agents. A great variety of problems share such risk interdependencies. As an illustration, consider the following examples.
Airline baggage security
Due to the network structure of (inter-)national flights, the security at one airport may have impacts on the security at other airports. More specifically, the risk that an aircraft of an airline, say, airline A, is harmed by an explosive device on board, depends not only on its own security system, but also on the fact that other airlines, say B, C etc. screen luggage items that are transferred into an aircraft of A, too. In general, luggage items transferred between aircrafts are almost never screened, for reasons of cost and timing. One trusts, in fact, that these luggage items were already screened at their departure terminal. The acquisition of a safety system by A can therefore only eliminate the risk of damage resulting from directly boarding passengers. The risk that dangerous luggage is transferred from other aircrafts cannot be excluded in this way. This indirect risk depends on the security systems at other airports.
2

Shared computer resources
Suppose an owner of a small business has a desktop computer with its own software and memory, but also keeps his largest and most important data files on a hard disk drive that is shared with many others. If a virus or other piece of malicious software enters the user network (e.g. via email of another user), it may erase the contents of the shared hard drive, and thus cause loss of profit due to business interruption. The safety of the shared hard drive depends on the diligence of all users whose desktop computers present potential points of contamination. Therefore, a single user´s incentive to invest in loss prevention (e.g. anti virus software, firewalls, spam-filters, etc.) is interdependent with the actions of the other users in the community. Then, a user´s direct risk is the risk that the hard drive will be erased by malicious software entering the system through his own desktop computer, while the remaining indirect risk is the risk that the hard drive will be erased by malicious software entering the system through someone else´s computer. He can reduce or eliminate the first risk by investing 1
In the literature, loss prevention is often called "self-protection" to mean a reduction in the probability of loss without affecting the magnitude of loss, while loss reduction is called "self-insurance", which means a reduction in the magnitude of loss without affecting the probability of loss. This distinction was originally introduced by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) .
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This problem of interdependent security was first analyzed by Kunreuther and Heal (2003) in a game-theoretic framework. See Kunreuther and Heal (2003) or Heal and Kunreuther (2005) . Note the empirical relevance by recalling the events of September 11, where security failures at airports in Boston, New Jersey, and Washington D.C. led to crashes at the World Trade Center and in Pennsylvania. A recent experimental study on this airline baggage security problem is given in Kearns and Ortiz (2004) .
in prevention, but cannot influence the latter.
3
Similar effects result, for example, with investments in prevention relating to certain catastrophe, health or liability risks. The mounting of a sprinkler system in a company decreases the risk of fire for the neighboring company. A farming business that utilizes certain hazardous substances also influences the risks of surrounding farms (i.e., through changes in genetic pools, etc). Many health risks are imposed by others. A common example is smokers creating cancer risks also for non-smokers via passive smoke, known as the second-hand smoking problem. Any individual investment to stop smoking benefits non-smokers as well, and hence such investment generates an externality. Risks of traffic accidents are interdependent, as well. Here, the direct risk is the risk that a careless driver causes an accident himself, the indirect risk is the risk that the driver is involved in an accident caused by someone else. He can only reduce the first risk by driving more cautiously, but he can do nothing about the second one. However, careful driving behavior diminishes the indirect risk for others.
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In most cases, as in the examples above, the possible loss can only be partially avoided by a preventive investment. A residual (indirect) risk remains, which depends on the behavior of other agents. Hence, there is a negative externality associated with not investing in loss prevention, i.e. the increased risk to others. Those who invest in loss prevention incur some cost (i.e., discomfort, time or money) and, in return, receive some individual benefit through the reduced individual expected loss, but a part of the benefit is public: the reduced indirect risk in the economy and all parties benefit from this. A well-known result in public economics states that when externalities exist, the total level of preventive activities in the economy will be "too low" relative to the socially efficient level. The economic agents take suboptimal account of the risks that they impose on others. Therefore, a resulting risk allocation might not be efficient. The challenge is to find a solution to the allocation problem.
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When agents face interdependent risks, the only way to internalize the externalities is to encourage agents to individually self-protect through a set of economic incentives that makes it more attractive for some or all agents to invest in loss prevention. 7 Insurance alters economic incentives, and for that reason this allocation problem may be solved in an insurance market. Externalities may be internalized within a compulsory insurance monopoly. However, compulsory insurance monopolies present a considerable intervention into the freedom of choice of individuals and organizations. Therefore, a particular justification should be given that a compulsory insurance monopoly may lead to a higher social level of loss prevention and, in this way, may increase allocative efficiency. Epple and Schäfer (1996) and Felder (1996) study the efficiency of compulsory insurance monopolies compared to competitive insurance markets empirically for Germany, while Jametti and Ungern-Sternberg (2005) and Ungern-Sternberg (1996 , 2003 , 2004 consider Switzerland and other European countries. 9,10 These studies find that insurance monopolies are more efficient than private providers, and suggest that a market with a state-monopoly for insurance leads to a remarkably higher level of social loss prevention than private markets. Why can insurance monopolies in practice lead to a remarkably higher social level of loss prevention? Ungern-Sternberg (2004) attributes the efficiency of monopolies to the possibility of internalization of prevention externalities that may arise within monopolies. 11 This issue has not yet been addressed theoretically. The present paper suggests a theoretical explanation.
Incentive problems associated with externalities have been analyzed theoretically in the insurance literature. Externalities of loss prevention have been studied, though in a different context, by Shavell (1982) who focuses on how liability rules and insurance affect incentives to reduce accident risks and the allocation of such risks. Shavell (1979) , Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) , and Bond and Crocker (1991) consider insurance market externalities induced by moral hazard. Shavell (1979) addresses agents´incentives to underconsume "care", which reduces the probability of loss. He finds that second-best contracts including deductibles lower those incentives, so that agents bear part of the risk resulting from their decisions regarding "care" themselves. Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) derive an optimal commodity taxation system. They find that when agents purchase hazardous goods, taxing those goods that are complementary and subsidizing those that are substitutable for loss prevention activities affects the agents´consumption decisions. Bond and Crocker (1991) analyze the effects on efficiency and equilibrium when consumers purchase products that are correlated with underlying loss propensities in an environment exhibiting both moral hazard and adverse selection. They show that categorization may permit first-best allocations as competitive Nash equilibria. In contrast
In the case of terrorism or natural hazard insurance, for example, agents may anticipate financial relief from the government in case of loss. In fact, a government cannot afford, due to political and social reasons, to leave victims of terrorism or natural catastrophes such as floods or earthquakes totally uncompensated. Therefore, public programs making relief to victims contingent on individual prevention investments cannot be considered credible. The agents tend to free-ride by not investing (enough) in loss prevention, and trust in government relief in case of loss. Government relief therefore distorts private incentives. A market failure results that can be solved by compulsory insurance. See, for example, Kaplow (1991) . In Spain, for instance, this free-rider problem is solved by a state-run insurance monopoly for natural catastrophe risks. See, for example, Ungern-Sternberg (2004), pp. 56-74. 9 This efficiency can be studied particularly well in Switzerland, due to the Swiss dual system in property insurance. In nineteen of the twenty six Swiss cantons, house owners are required by law to obtain coverage for natural catastrophes and fire from cantonal insurance providers. This coverage is only available with private insurance companies in the remaining seven cantons. The cantonal insurance monopolies are found to be more efficient than private providers, and there is a remarkably higher social investment in loss prevention. Cantonal insurance monopolies earn a low or zero rate of return, insurance premiums are regulated on a cantonal basis, and the creation of a minimum reserve is required by law.
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In general, loss prevention activities in a society can be of collective or individual nature. For example, collective measures target at general fire-protection or the mitigation of flood risks in certain exposed areas. In the case of an investment in collective prevention by the insurer, compulsory insurance is important in order to induce the monopolist to undertake those investments. Note that without compulsory insurance, if the monopolist could manipulate loss probabilities by an investment in collective loss prevention, one option of an agent would be to enjoy the lower loss probability, but not to purchase any insurance coverage. Hence, a key feature of an investment in collective prevention by the insurer is the nonexcludability of agents who choose not to purchase insurance from also experiencing the reduction in loss probability. See Schlesinger and Venezian (1986) . However, a large part of preventive activities is individual in nature and is therefore not manageable on a collective level. These measures are individual investments that target at the reduction of individual expected loss. We will focus on preventive activities of individual nature in this paper. Therefore, the insurer's premiums should be calculated to motivate the policyholders to individually invest in loss prevention. From the insurer´s viewpoint, this makes perfect economic sense because it benefits from a higher social prevention level (resulting in lower expected claims payments). Thus the insurer has an economic reason to subsidize preventive activities in the economy.
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See Ungern-Sternberg (2004), pp. 112-113. to this paper, Bond and Crocker are concerned with the insurance market externality resulting from the increased probability of loss by the purchaser, as opposed to any direct effects on third parties. While most of these models consider homogenous agents or a representative individual, the economy consists of heterogenous agents in general.
The purpose of the paper is threefold. First, we study economic incentives to invest in loss prevention for heterogenous risk averse agents in a model with interdependent risks. We intend to find a solution to the above described allocation problem. Interdependencies of risks are modeled following Kunreuther and Heal (2003) . 12 Secondly, we implement the concept of interdependent risks to insurance markets and demonstrate that a monopolistic insurer with imperfect information can achieve the socially optimal prevention level in the economy by engaging in premium discrimination. 13 Finally, we thereby offer a theoretical explanation of empirical observations that the social prevention level in markets with (compulsory) insurance monopolies tends to be substantially higher than in competitive insurance markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the formal model in an expected utility framework. We begin by analyzing the simplest case of two homogenous agents. Then we introduce multiple agents and heterogeneity. The following section characterizes the Nash equilibrium, first when insurance is not available, then with insurance at actuarially fair premiums. Finally, it is shown that, given compulsory insurance, a monopolistic insurer can achieve the social optimum by engaging in premium discrimination and relying on the agentsś elf-categorization. A short discussion and some concluding remarks follow.
A Model of Interdependent Risks
Consider an economy in which each economic agent is endowed with an initial wealth, W , and faces a potential loss, L. An agent´s utility U (y) is a function of final wealth y. The utility function is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave, i.e. agents are risk averse. The agents maximize their expected utility of final wealth.
The agents have to decide whether or not to invest in loss prevention. This decision is a discrete choice: an agent either invests or not. Let there be two possible ways in which a loss can occur: it can either be caused directly by an agent (direct loss), or indirectly via the actions of others (indirect loss). Losses are not additive. 14 The cost of investing in prevention is c. A direct loss 12 Kunreuther and Heal (2003) have analyzed the interdependencies of terrorism risks in the context of international airline security for identical and risk neutral agents. They expanded their work to a more general model of interdependent risks in Heal and Kunreuther (2004) . In the general model, three classes of problems of Interdependent Security ( In an IDS-problem of the first class, the risk of loss cannot be completely eliminated by an investment in security, there remains a residual indirect risk from others. This situation is the one illustrated in our examples. An example for a class 2 problem is a market for vaccination. This is characterized by the fact that the risk of loss can be completely eliminated by an investment in protection, the vaccine. In an IDS-problem of the third class, positive externalities arise. An example is investments in research and development. This paper focuses on an IDS-problem of the first class which seems to be the most important. However, the model can be applied to other IDS-problems.
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In an insurance market with different risk types, an insurer often uses observable or known criteria that may be related to the underlying risk in order to sort the policyholders in categories for which different policies are sold. This categorization is often referred to as "discrimination".
14 A loss can only occur once. The maximum loss is L, even if both possible causes of loss occur at the same time. See Kunreuther and Heal (2004) .
can be avoided with certainty by an investment in prevention. We assume W > c + L > 0. Prevention costs should not exceed the possible loss, hence 0 ≤ c ≤ L. Four possible states of final wealth of an agent result: without prevention, the final wealth of an agent is y 1 = W in case of no loss, and y 2 = W − L in case of loss. If an agent invests in prevention, his final wealth is y 3 = W − c in case of no loss and y 4 = W − c − L in case of loss.
The probability of a direct loss is p. p satisfies 0 < p < 1. The probability that a loss is caused indirectly by the actions of others is q(x), where x denotes the proportion of agents in the economy without loss prevention. x satisfies 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. In general, the higher the proportion of agents without prevention in the economy, the higher will be the individual indirect risk (infection risk). Therefore, we assume q´(x) > 0 and q´´(x) ≥ 0. q(x) satisfies 0 ≤ q(x) ≤ q, where q(1) = q < 1 and q(0) = 0. These assumptions may be interpreted as follows. If nobody invests in prevention (x = 1), then q denotes the maximum infection risk; this risk will generally be smaller than one. Furthermore, if everybody invests in prevention (x = 0), then the infection risk is zero.
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The events "a loss is caused directly by an agent" (d) and "a loss is caused indirectly via others" (a) are assumed to be statistically independent. The probability of "cause of loss occurs" in case of no prevention is then
In case of prevention, this probability is reduced to q(x).
Interdependent Risks for two Agents
The simplest situation of interdependent risks, involving only two agents, can be illustrated in a game-theoretic framework. The payoff matrix of expected utilities for agents A 1 and A 2 is shown in Figure 1 . 16 Both agents are identical. In case of no prevention, let q(x) = q since there are only two parties involved. If both invest in prevention, the expected utility of each agent is U (W − c).
If A 1 invests in prevention (P) but not A 2 (N), A 1 is only exposed to the indirect risk q from A 2 . Thus, the expected utility of
we get the symmetrical result. If neither agent invests in prevention, then both are exposed to the additional risk of contamination from the other. Therefore, the expected utilities for both Figure 1 .
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Assuming that both agents decide simultaneously whether or not to invest in prevention, there is no possibility for cooperation. For P to be a dominant strategy for A 1 , we need
Referring to the airline baggage security example, the probabilities p and q(x) can be understood as follows. p is the probability of damage arising on an agent´s (airline´s) own property (airplane) if the agent has not invested in security (direct loss). The expected loss from this event is pL. If the agent has invested in a security system this risk is zero. The probability that a bag containing a bomb and accepted for carriage by one airline is transferred by it to another is q(x). See Kunreuther and Heal (2003) or Heal and Kunreuther (2005) .
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This section follows the model of Kunreuther and Heal (2003) . The novelty in our model is risk aversion of the agents.
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The term qU(W − L) + (1 − q)U(W ) is multiplied with (1 − p) due to the assumtion that losses are not additive.
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If A 1 is indifferent between N and P, we assume that he invests in prevention. It suffices to investigate the dominance of a strategy for A 1 , since the situation is symmetric for both agents.
(1) simply means that c ≤ pL + π[p], where π[p] denotes the risk premium when the loss probability equals p. 19 The cost of investing in prevention must be less than the sum of expected direct loss and risk premium. In addition, we need
. This (tighter) inequality reflects the possibiliy of damage caused by the other agent. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium will be (P,
, the resulting Nash equilibrium is (N,N) .
both equilibria are possible and the solution to the game is indeterminate.
20
A 2 P N For
, (P,P) is preferable to the other possible equilibria. If social welfare of the agents is interpreted as the sum of their individual expected utilities, then the optimal social solution will be achieved with
Assuming identical agents, we have thus found two possible solutions to the game: either all agents invest in prevention or no one does. In order to find a more general solution, we introduce multiple heterogeneous agents by assuming different prevention costs in the next section.
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The risk premium as we use it here, was introduced by Pratt (1964) . For any concave utility function U (·), the risk premium
The risk premium π[p] denotes the maximum an agent is willing to pay to securely receive the expected value of the probability distribution instead of the probability distribution itself. 
Interdependent Risks for a Continuum of Agents
Let there be a continuum of heterogeneous risk averse agents. Agents differ only in prevention cost.
21 Agents with a "low" cost will tend to invest in prevention, while those with "high" cost will not. The agents can be listed in ascending order according to their individual cost c. The total number of agents in the economy is normalized to unity. Prevention costs are distributed with the (non-degenerate) distribution function F (c) and density function f (c), defined over the support [0, L]. The agents are free to choose whether or not to invest in loss prevention. The expected utility of an agent who does not invest in loss prevention is
while the expected utility of an agent investing in prevention at a cost c is given by
An agent will invest in loss prevention if the excess of expected utility with a preventive investment over the expected utility without such an investment is non-negative:
To find the equilibrium, define the excess of expected utility to the marginal agent as
with
and
where x(b c) denotes the proportion of agents without prevention in the economy, given that the marginal agent has a cost b c: Alternatively, it could be assumed that the agents have different prevention technologies. They can avoid a direct loss by using such a technology. Different technologies cause different costs.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that an agent invests in prevention when he is indifferent between investing and not investing.
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Externalities have been analyzed in a similar way by Brito et al. (1991) who investigate a market for vaccines against infectious diseases. The authors compare the equilibria resulting from free vaccination and mandatory vaccination with the social optimum. Their model refers to Mirrlees' conclusions of optimal taxation. See Mirrlees (1971) .
so that (1) if nobody invests in prevention and therefore the indirect risk is very high, it is worth to undertake preventive measures to reduce expected loss when prevention is costless, while (2) if everybody invests in prevention and therefore the indirect risk is zero, then an investment in prevention that is extremely costly (L) is not worth being undertaken to avoid the expected direct loss pL.
(9) and (10) ensure that there exists an interior solution c * , where 0 < c * < L, that satisfies
Hence, the excess of expected utility is positive for c < c * and negative for c > c * , so that "low cost" agents with c ≤ c * will invest in loss prevention while "high cost" agents with c > c * will not. 24 The competitive Nash equilibrium is then given by
The Nash equilibrium c * divides all agents into two groups: those who do invest in loss prevention and those who don´t. Note that the Nash equilibrium is similar to the introductory 2-agents equilibrium: all agents with a cost c ≤ c * invest in loss prevention.
Let social welfare be represented by the utilitarian social welfare function S(b c), the "sum" of the individual expected utilities of all agents. The socially optimal prevention level in the economy is the level that maximizes the welfare function. To simplify notation, we will write the functions V (x(b c)), R(c, x(b c)) and q(x(b c)) in the following as functions of c and b c, respectively. Social welfare S(b c) ≥ 0 is then given by
The first term in (14) denotes the expected utilities of all agents with prevention, the second the expected utilities of all agents without prevention. The first-order condition for an interior maximum is
24
We cannot prove in general that the interior solution is unique for all possible parameters in Ψ(b c). In reasonable numerical examples, we always found only one interior solution. In addition, Ψ(b c) is often strictly decreasing so that an unique interior solution is ensured. However, the case in which there might be more than one solutions makes no economic sense and is therefore not relevant throughout the paper.
The second and third term in (15) are non-negative (and non-decreasing in x). The first term in brackets is simply the excess of expected utility Ψ(b c). As a consequence, given f (b c) > 0, S(b c) has an interior maximum at c * * , defined by (15) (11) follows
At the Nash equilibrium c * , social welfare is not maximized. We have c * * > c * due to (17).
Hence, x(c * * ) < x(c * ), the proportion of agents without prevention is higher in the Nash equilibrium than in the welfare optimum. Thus, we have shown that the social prevention level in a situation without insurance is "too low" from a social planner´s point of view. This result is well-known in public economics: in an economy with externalities, in equilibrium agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level.
Introducing compulsory insurance, a monopolistic insurer can act as a social planner, and in this way increase the social prevention level by setting appropriate prevention incentives through insurance premiums. This issue is studied in the next section. 
Compulsory Insurance Monopoly
Consider a risk-neutral monopolistic insurer with no transaction costs. Insurance is compulsory for all agents, thus there is full market participation and coverage is provided to all agents. We assume that insurance premiums are subject to public regulation in the sense that the expected profit of the monopolist is limited (for example by government) to some constant k ≥ 0. 
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With reference to our introductory examples, we consider terrorism insurance, loss of profits insurance (business interruption insurance), health insurance and liability insurance, respectively.
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This assumption is necessary to limit the insurer´s profit to a maximum. If we assumed profit maximization for the insurer, it would, as a consequence of compulsory insurance, demand infinitely high premiums. The results of our model would then be implausible. Therefore a restriction is needed here. Note that this restriction has some empirical justification in Switzerland: the property insurance monopolies in the Swiss cantons are under public control and earn a low or zero rate of return. See Jametti and Ungern-Sternberg (2005), p. 27.
By concluding insurance contracts, the agents substitute their expected uncertain loss-expenses for the payment of a certain insurance premium. An insurance policy (P, I) consists of a premium paid by an agent regardless of state P and an indemnification payment I in case of loss.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that losses are completely reimbursed after an accident occurs, i.e. there is no risk sharing between the insurer and its customers. The indemnification payment I in case of loss equals L. For the time being, we assume that the monopolist offers an actuarially fair price, hence the premium equals the expected loss of a policyholder (i.e., the expected loss with and without an investment in loss prevention, respectively). We therefore begin the analysis, as a point of reference, by assuming zero expected profits of the monopolist (k = 0).
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The policyholders can be divided into two groups: "low cost" agents who invest in loss prevention and "high cost" agents who don´t. While the insurer cannot, in general, observe individual prevention cost, it may, however, assign fair premiums to each policyholder if it knew the social prevention level and to which group a policyholder belongs. Suppose that the insurer can neither observe individual prevention cost nor an individual investment in prevention. It has, however, an idea about the distribution of costs in the economy. We make the reasonable assumption that the agents voluntarily provide evidence of their preventive measures to the insurer in order to get the lower (fair) premium based on their lower risk. Assuming further that risk revelation imposes no additional cost to a policyholder, an agent with "low cost" and for whom prevention is worthwhile has indeed an incentive to truthfully reveal himself as being a "good risk". 29 In addition, the insurer can easily determine the cost of the marginal agent and therefore the social prevention level; it does not need any information about individual prevention costs (i.e., from (20) follows directly (23)).
At a social prevention level b c, let the fair premium of an agent not investing in prevention be P 0 (b c) = {p + (1 − p)q(b c)}L and for an agent investing in prevention
The expected utility of an agent without prevention is then (under full insurance coverage, i.e., I = L):
while the expected utility of an agent with prevention is given by
This assumption is only by notational convenience and without any loss of generality. Constraining the monopoly profit to be an arbitrary value (including a general margin or premium loading) rather than zero has no qualitative impact on the results in this section or throughout the paper. We refrain from introducing a general margin since this does not play a role in our model.
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Alternatively, it might be assumed that the insurer can costlessly observe whether an agent invests in loss prevention, but cannot observe individual prevention cost.
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Without prevention, the probability of loss given a social prevention level of b c is {p + (1 − p)q(b c)}. With prevention, this probability is reduced to q(b c). See (6) and (7), respectively.
An investment in loss prevention is attractive to an agent if
Let again Φ(b c, b c) ≡ Φ(b c), then along with 0 ≤ q(b c) ≤ q < 1, it follows that
(1) at position b c = 0
so that Φ(b c) has an interior solution c I * , where 0 < c I * < L, and
( 2 3 ) c I * is the Nash equilibrium with insurance at actuarially fair premiums.
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At the equilibrium c I * , the fair premium for agents with prevention is P (c I * ) = q(c I * )L and for agents without prevention it is P 0 (c I * ) = {p+(1−p)q(c I * )}L, respectively, corresponding to individual expected loss with and without an investment in loss prevention.
Social welfare is given by
Keeping in mind that dx(b c)/db c = −f (b c), the first-order condition for an interior maximum of e S(b c) implies 
Comparing c I * with c * , observe that the equilibrium c * included some risk premium. This is due to the risk aversion of the agents. Being now fully compensated in case of a loss, the complete insurance coverage at fair premiums implies that the agents act as if they were risk neutral; therefore, no risk premium appears in the equilibrium c I * . c I * * is the socially optimal prevention level with insurance. At position c I * , we obtain
c I * < c I * * results. This implies that x(c I * ) > x(c I * * ), the proportion of agents without prevention is higher in the Nash equilibrium than in the welfare optimum. Clearly, given insurance is available at fair premiums, the social prevention level is not optimal. Externalities are not internalized in the Nash equilibrium.
The insurer may engage in premium discrimination in order to raise the social prevention level.
In particular, it could design different contracts for different types, relying on the policyholders´self-categorization: It can offer a premium rebate -relative to the fair premium -to those investing in prevention, and/or it can impose a premium loading to those not investing in prevention, and let the agents voluntarily decide, on that basis of their individual prevention cost and the provided rebate or loading, whether or not to invest in loss prevention. The sequence of the considered game between the insurer and its customers can then be seen as follows. At a first stage, the insurer offers appropriate contracts including a premium loading and/or rebate on fair premiums. Then, at a second stage, the customers choose a contract and decide simultaneously on the basis of their own cost whether or not to invest in loss prevention. The insurer can act as a social planner by demanding premiums that are independent of the actuarial value of the policy (i.e., the expected loss), but depend on the "attitude" of the agents. In this way, the social prevention level would rise and the individual expected loss of each agent would decrease. For this reason, risk categorization may increase allocative efficiency.
For agents without prevention, the insurer may offer a premium P 0 (b c)+γ, where γ > 0 denotes a premium penalty (loading). For agents with prevention, it may offer a premium P (b c) − δ, where δ > 0 denotes a premium rebate. The insurer can then ensure that the socially optimal prevention level is achieved by charging penalties or by offering rebates on fair premiums. Hence, it engages in premium discrimination so that the agents individually place themselves into one of two groups: those who invest in prevention and those who don´t. This result is shown in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1.
The insurer can achieve the socially optimal prevention level c I * * by engaging in premium discrimination. It can charge a premium penalty e γ on fair premiums for agents without prevention (and insure agents with prevention at their fair premium). It can also offer a premium rebate e δ on fair premiums for agents with prevention (and insure agents without prevention at their fair premium).
Proof: Social welfare is maximized if Hence, the optimal prevention level c I * * is achievable by offering a rebate e δ on fair premiums for agents investing in prevention. ¥ Due to the premium penalty e γ, the insurer makes an additional expected profit of e γ · x(c I * * ).
In case of a rebate e δ, the insurer makes an additional expected loss of e δ · (1 − x(c I * * )). We will argue in the following that the insurer can also achieve the socially optimal prevention level by offering a combination of rebates and penalities on fair premiums, and at the same time make a positive expected profit k ≥ 0. The insurer can offer an optimal premium discrimination mechanism so that the socially efficient proportion of agents decide to invest in preventive measures.
The marginal agent will be indifferent between prevention and no prevention if
Assuming that the monopolist tries to achieve the maximum-permitted profit, an optimal premium discrimination mechanism must ensure that the expected monopoly profit is k. It follows that 
Proof:
Full insurance coverage at a fair premium implies that risk averse policyholders act as if they were risk neutral. Hence, full insurance at fair premiums plus a fixed loading fee (or minus a fixed rebate) causes the realization of the same level of preventive investment as with risk neutral policyholders, simply because the premium is marginally fair. Since we are only interested in the social prevention level, it is sufficient to show the proof for risk neutral agents. Then the expected utility of the agents is W − c − P (b c) in case of no prevention, and W − P 0 (b c) in case of prevention. Social welfare is
We rewrite (37), by using (36), to read
Again, e Φ(0) > 0 together with e Φ(L) < 0 ensure that an unique interior solution c II * exists,
given by c
Discussion and Conclusion
As well-known in public economics, in an economy with externalities, economic agents invest too little in loss prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred on others. This paper examines the possibility that the social prevention level is improved by a monopolistic insurer engaging in premium discrimination, given interdependent risks in the insurance market. While interdependent risks have not been studied in the insurance literature, casual observation suggests that often an agent´s decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilites faced by others.
The paper makes two contributions to the insurance literature. The first contribution is that it analyzes an insurance market with externalities of loss prevention in a model with multiple heterogenous risk averse agents. When risks are interdependent, the social prevention level -both in case of no insurance and with (compulsory) insurance at actuarially fair premiums -is not socially efficient. However, a monopolistic insurer with imperfect information may achieve the socially optimal prevention level in the economy. The insurer engages in premium discrimination where premiums are optimally chosen to reflect marginal social cost or benefit. For instance, an agent who invests in loss prevention enjoys a premium rebate not only for the reduced individual expected loss but also for the reduction in expected loss to others. The insurer designs different contracts for different risk types, relying on the agents´incentives to self-protect. Policyholders who find it worthwhile reveal their type. Premium discrimination might even permit a complete internalization of the externalities.
The second contribution of the paper to the insurance literature is that it offers a theoretical explanation of empirical observations that the social prevention level in markets with (compulsory) insurance monopolies tends to be substantially higher than in competitive insurance markets. In a competitive insurance market with interdependent risks, no allocative efficiency is attainable (whether insurance is compulsory or not). The rationale for this is as follows. Suppose a market with many risk neutral insurers being in competition to attract customers, and suppose insurers act so as to maximize expected profits. The only policies that will survive in the market are those that yield zero expected profits to insurers, and full insurance coverage to agents. This is due to the well-known result in the insurance literature that arbitrarily risk averse agents will buy full insurance coverage, given the premium is actuarially fair. 36 Hence, the outcome is full insurance at fair premiums. Then, the competitive Nash equilibrium corresponds to c I * . However, we have shown that in an environment with externalities social welfare is not optimal at c I * . Due to the possibility of adverse selection in this market, an insurer acting in a competitive market environment cannot induce agents without prevention to pay a premium loading (i.e., other insurers can undercut the demanded price by ignoring externalities. The only premium for which there is no incentive to undercut a rival firm is the fair premium.). As a result, externalities cannot be internalized in a competitive insurance market.
37
Furthermore, an insurer in a competitive insurance market may not have the same incentive (compared to the monopolist) to engage in premium discrimination in order to raise the social prevention level. This is because the monopolist participates in the entire prevention returns, i.e., lower expected claims payments to all policyholders. In a competitive market, an insurer's advantage of internalization would be shared among all providers and a typical free-rider problem results.
Regarding the roles of insurance coverage and premiums, the model presented in this paper is not rich enough to allow agents to choose partial insurance coverage or even no coverage at all. However, full insurance would be chosen if premiums were actuarially fair, and so the Nash equilibrium with insurance at fair premiums derived in this paper would also hold in that case. If the insurer offers any desired level of insurance coverage at a price equal to the actuarial value of the policy plus a fixed fee not higher than the agents´risk premium, the level of coverage desired by the agents will always be full insurance coverage. Hence, introducing a loading that is independent of the actuarial value of the policy and the level of insurance coverage implies that either full insurance coverage or no insurance is purchased.
38
As a result, the assumptions of compulsory insurance and full insurance coverage in this paper do not restrict the analysis, but simplify it. Clearly, as long as the agents are sufficiently risk averse, compulsory insurance might not necessarily be required and the introduction of premium loadings (and rebates) might lead to the social optimum.
39
Finally, the efficiency gain of an insurance monopoly relative to a competitive insurance market will depend on the magnitude of externalities in the market considered. In general, the more important externalities in the market are, the more an insurance monopoly makes sense.
The present analysis provides a theoretical basis for a more thorough understanding of the efficiency of insurance monopolies in practice and suggests that further research on this issue may produce new insights.
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Premium rebates could solve the externality problem but imply negative expected profits and would therefore not be offered by an insurer.
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See, for instance, Doherty (1975) , p. 452.
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Generally, it depends upon the utility function and the loading whether an agent purchases full insurance or no coverage at all. Essentially, the fixed loading is an entry cost for an agent´s entry into the insurance market. Once this fee has been paid, the agent might purchase any level of coverage at an actuarially fair price. Hence, either the fee is "too high" and no insurance is purchased, or full insurance coverage is chosen. The switching level of this entry cost is the risk premium π. The monopolist may take the entry cost into account and calculate the loading respectively in order to induce all agents to purchase full coverage. The expected profit of the insurer would then be determined by the utility function, i.e. the risk premium, of the agents.
